When large, strategic investors internalize their price impact,
non-competitive markets can be more liquid than competitive ones, and capital flows toward
risk-averse investors can lower safe-asset prices in flight-to-safety episodes.
with Isha Agarwal, Ron Giammarino, and Emmanuel Yimfor
How autocratic restrictions on property rights—limits on emigration and
the power to expropriate—shape debt financing of infrastructure and credit spreads.
A complete-market Lucas economy with rare disasters in which investors revise
disaster beliefs lazily; option-implied tails recover a wealth-weighted belief aggregate rather
than the physical disaster rate, and the term structure of the tail reveals the survival records
behind those beliefs.
A continuous-time model of belief revision under Ortoleva’s (2012)
hypothesis-testing rule, in which the record a belief has survived—not the belief
itself—governs the hazard of its revision, with implications for expectation formation
and asset pricing.
Information asymmetry makes potential predators more likely to provide liquidity
than to trade predatorily against a distressed trader, helping stabilize illiquid markets.